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CASE COMMENT
tions; plaintiff could secure the information he sought, prior to a
final hearing on making the injunction permanent, through dis-
covery proceedings. Then, if the agent failed to permit discovery,
appropriate sanctions, other than contempt," could be imposed
on him. One of these sanctions - a default judgment - would
place the consequences of failure to disclose on the real party at
fault, the Government, not a mere subordinate.
Criminal Law-Constitutional Law: Gouled Rule and
Authorization by Spouse of Search and Seizure in
Absence of Defendant or Suspect
Defendant appealed from a second degree murder conviction
contending that a bullet admitted into evidence at his trial was
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment Defendant's wife
allowed the police to recover the bullet from a ceiling into which
defendant had discharged his gun one year before the crime in
question was committed. The murder weapon, which was never
found, was linked to the defendant by proving that the bullets
recovered from the ceiling and the victim were fired from the
same gun. Had defendant's wife not permitted the officers to
retrieve the bullet, it probably could not have been obtained by
a search warrant.? The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendants con-
viction and held that the wife, being in possession and control of
the premises, could authorize a reasonable search for, and re-
covery of, the bullet, since it was not defendant's personal effect,
and in any case he had abandoned it. Roberts v. United States,
832 F.d 892 (8th Cir. 1964).s
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37. These sanctions include, besides contempt,
orders to: (1) take any fact as established for the purposes of the action;
(2) refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses; (3) strike out pleadings, dismiss the action, or render a
judgment by default against the disobedient party.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides, "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
2. FED. R. Cam. P. 41(b) only allows a search for stolen or embezzled
property, instruments of a crime, and property used to aid a foreign govern-
ment.
3. Of. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240 (1960); United States v.
Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963). The
Roberts court did not discuss the question of how one may abandon property
in his own home. In Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the Court
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The fourth amendment evolved from the fear of invasion of
privacy by general searches under writs of assistance. By requir-
ing that searches be reasonable, it insures that individual privacy
is not at the mercy of every petty officer.4 The fourth amendment
also supplements the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination by prohibiting the unreasonable seizure of many
papers and effects, which the fifth amendment prevents from
being admitted into evidence." To effectuate the fourth amend-
ment policies, it has been necessary to restrict the use of searches
as an instrument of law enforcement.6
The fourth amendment directive is implemented in various
ways. Illegally obtained evidence is excluded from criminal trials.7
Search warrants, issued only on probable cause, must describe
the place to be searched, and the objects sought." Gouled v.
United States9 prohibits search and seizure of objects of purely
evidentiary value. Designed to protect privacy, the restrictive
effect of the rules on law enforcement arouses controversy. The
Gouled rule, particularly, may exclude important evidence while
affording little protection to privacy. 0 For this reason courts have
held that the mere dropping of contraband on the floor of a cab was not
abandonment. Perhaps, the less personal an item is, the easier it is to find
an abandonment.
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 680 (1886). In Wolf v. Colorado,
838 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared, "the security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police -which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."
5., U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "no person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." See Boyd v. United
States, supra note 4, at 683.
6. Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 STAw. L. REV.
318, 851 (1964).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S.
383 (1914).
8. FED. R. CRMM. P. 41(C).
9. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). See generally Note, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 319 (1953).
10. See 8 WIGmoRE, EviENCE § 2184a, at 45-46 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
(called an unfortunate rule). Both Professors Kamisar and Inbau agree that
the Gouled rule is improper and unreasonable. Inbau, Public Safety and Indi-
vidual Civil Liberties: A Prosecutor's Stand, 58 J. Cnum. L., C. & P.S. 85, 87
(1962); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and
"Theories," 58 1. Can. L., C. & P.S. 171, 177 (1962).
Because of the difficulty of determining the exact location to be searched
and goods to be seized, California police avoid use of the warrant process
and usually search without one. In Los Angeles County only seventeen search
warrants were issued in 1954. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CATiw. L. REV. 565,
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strained to find that items are fruits or instruments of the crime,"
and one state attempts to avoid Gouled by statute.12
One of the serious problems raised by the fourth amendment
is the extent to which a spouse may authorize a search of the
premises in the absence of the defendant or suspect.'- To the
extent that the fourth amendment secures the "right of the people
... in their ... houses ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures," the determination in Roberts that the wife could allow
the officers to search since she had control and use of the prem-
ises seems correct.' The sanctity of the home guaranteed by the
570 (1955). By 1962 the figure was still at an average of one and one-half
warrants per month. Collings, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure
-An Amicus Curiae Brief, 50 CAIw. L. Ruv. 421, 455 (1962).
11. See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's
View, 44 MaN. L. REv. 891, 915 (1960).
12. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524(4). The validity of the California statute may
be questioned since Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), appears to require
the states to apply federal standards of search and seizure. Arguably, however,
a seizure of purely evidentiary matter does not violate fourteenth amendment
due process if the search is conducted in a reasonable manner. Ker may only
impose the federal standard of reasonableness on states while not requiring
adoption of every procedural device, such as the Gouled rule, to insure the
limitation of the search.
From a practical standpoint the effect of Gouled on the states could be
disastrous. Evidence forming the usual method of detection of many state
crimes may be excluded by Gouled. For example, such basic evidence as
fingerprints, hairs, or even a corpse, may be ruled inadmissible because of
Gouled. See generally Collings, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure
-An Anicus Curiae Brief, 50 CAur. L. REv. 41 (1962); CAI. SENATE
INTEM JUDICIARY COMM., FOURTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGIsLATURE
(1955-1957) 391.
13. The problem may also arise where one party allows a search over the
other party's objection. E.g., Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 87 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920). Ordi-
narily such a search is not allowed. The best rationale appears to be that one
joint tenant may not use his property rights to the injury of another joint
tenant. Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 889 (1963). However, if the defendant does not make his objection
known to the officers, and they reasonably rely on the waiver, he cannot voice
his protest after the search. See United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847
(N.D. Ill. 1961).
14. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
935 (1954), and Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 844 (1948), approach the problem in terms of the wife's control of
the premises. When examined in this manner, it is no longer a question of
waiver but one of assertion of the wife's property rights. At least one jurisdiction
has gone so far as to judge the question from the standpoint of the control
over the property that the police assume the wife had, rather than that which
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fourth amendment is preserved when permission of the spouse
is obtained. The Roberts court established no limitations on the
search of the home other than that the search must be reason-
able.'5 Since it might be possible to subvert the requirements
for obtaining search warrants by obtaining the wife's permission
to search the premises while the suspect is absent or in custody,
this limitation may not be sufficient? Rather than look solely
at the manner in which the search is conducted to determine its
reasonableness, it would be preferable to examine also what is
searched or seized and determine whether the wife's right to
control the premises outweighs the suspect's privacy interest
therein.
Several courts have sensed this problem and have taken steps
to meet it. A wife may not allow a search or seizure of her hus-
band's papers and effects" - they are independently protected
she actually had. This allows the police to make a "reasonable mistake." See
People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 292 P.2d 518, cert. denied, 851 U.S. 972
(1956); People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. Rd 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955). One author claims
this approach places a premium on stupid and ignorant police who tend to
see control when in fact there is none. Manwaring, supra note 6, at 836. Since
the mistake must be reasonable, it would appear that Manwaring's argument
is invalid because a "reasonableness" test makes no special allowance for the
actions of an ignorant officer.
Contra, State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963); Simmons v. State,
94 Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951). In both Pina and Simmons the courts
felt that one person could not waive another's constitutional rights. The
logical extreme of these decisions is Dalton v. State, 280 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d
509 (1952), where a wife could not authorize search of the family car though
she held title to it.
15. 332 F.2d at 897.
16. E.g., Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964); Joslin v.
State, 165 Tex. Crim. 161, 805 S.W.2d 851 (1957). Both of these searches
were apparently exploratory since they involved the removal of stairs and
paneling. In addition, neither court mentioned the fact that the police knew
the contraband was in a different place all along.
17. Accord, United States v. Hopps, 215 F. Supp. 7M4, 750 (D. Md. 1962),
which held an attorney could not allow a search of his client's personal papers.
State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962), held a search of the
defendant's cuff-link box could not be authorized by his wife. In Holzhey
v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955), a search of the defendant's
locked cases was declared invalid though done with the consent of the owners
of the premises, in spite of the fact that the trial court seems to have found
that the defendant was a guest rather than a lessee. Contra, United States v.
Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961); State v. Shephard, 124 N.W.2d 712
(Iowa 1963). Both allowed searches of locked cases by means of third party
waiver. Rees distinguished Holzhey because the latter involved a lessor-lessee
relationship, contrary to the trial court's finding in that case. Rees involved
kidnapping while Holzhey involved petty theft.
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under the fourth amendment.1 s It would also follow that she
may not authorize a search of a room over which her husband has
exclusive control and use."' Nor would it be consistent with the
fourth amendment to allow a search that could reasonably be
expected to require the permission of both parties, such as one
demanding the removal of flooring or other alteration of the
premises? 0 However, there could be no harm in the wife allowing
a search of rooms over which she has sole or joint control. Nor is
it objectionable for her to authorize a search and examination
of evidence that is in plain sight2 ' - so long as the evidence is
not papers and effects of the husband. Such rules lead to a har-
monization of the conflicting interests, since the wife is allowed
to exercise her right of control over the premises while not invad-
ing those areas where only the privacy of the husband is at stake.
The question whether the bullet was improperly seized -
application of the Gouled rule - was not raised in Roberts. Lan-
guage in Abel v. United States"2 indicates that seizure of purely
evidentiary articles is illegal, even where a search is legitimate.2
Gouled certainly limits seizures made under a valid search war-
rant to fruits and instruments of a crime?' The cases disagree
with respect to whether it is permissible to seize solely evidentiary
articles incident to a lawful arrest?5 The necessity of preventing
18. See note 1 swpra.
19. In Reeves v. Warden, 226 F. Supp. 953, 960 (D. Md. 1964), the court
apparently attempted to formulate such a rule, holding that petitioner's
mother could not authorize a search of any area of petitioner's room set aside
exclusively for his own use, nor could she allow a seizure of his effects, since
they were not fruits or instruments of crime.
90. Joslin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 161, 305 S.W.2d 351 (1957) (where
flooring and paneling were removed).
21. United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1962). The
court allowed a bailee to let officers search the bailor's car but implied that
if the search were detailed it would have been invalid. Contra, Bellam v.
State, 283 Md. 868, 196 A.2d 891 (1964).
22. 862 U.S. 217 (1960).
28.
[Not every item may be seized which is properly inspectible by the
Government in the course of a legal search; for example, private papers
desired by the Government merely for use as evidence may not be
seized, no matter how lawful the search which discovers them .
Id. at 234-85.
24. 255 U.S. at 310.
25. Since the Gouled decision, the Supreme Court has limited permissible
seizures to contraband, instruments or fruits of crime, and weapons. Harris
v. United States, 831 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); see, e.g., Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 284-35 (1960); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 19R
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destruction of contraband, escape of the captive, and the need
to protect the arresting officer26 may justify a broader scope of
seizure. But none of the considerations peculiar to an arrest apply
if a search is conducted with the authorization of the spouse or
other person in control of the premises. Therefore, the Gouled
limitations seem to apply in the Roberts case?"
The Gouled limitations on seizure have sometimes been viewed
as having the sole purpose of insuring that the preceding search
is reasonable?* Even if this be so, an attempt to avoid the Gouled
seizure limitations by examining only the reasonableness of the
search cannot be justified without completely vitiating Gouled
itself. 9 More often, application of Gouled is limited by a very
liberal interpretation of what are fruits and instruments of a
crime.30 Assuming, as indicated in Gouled, that the subjects of
seizure have a constitutional significance of their own, the bullet
in Roberts was not a fruit or instrument of a crime. Hence the
only basis for admitting the bullet into evidence would be that
it was abandoned.3a In passing on the different question whether
the search was reasonable, the Roberts court simply stated that
the bullet had been abandoned. Even though it is difficult to find
an abandonment in one's own home, the impersonal character
of the bullet and the lack of interest shown in it by the defend-
ant seem to justify the court's conclusion. Thus the result on
the seizure question raised by Gouled, and not treated in Roberts,
seems to turn on the same factors as the search question actually
treated by the court.
(1927). Yet cases like United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 229 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), still arise in the lower federal courts. Pardo-Bolland denied
defendant's motion to return as illegally seized incident to his arrest for a nar-
cotics violation, inter alia, cash, travelers checks, a wallet, a passport, and
a United Nations Delegation Pass. On its own motion the Government con-
sented to return a lock of hair with a card saying, "I love you." The court
relied on language in Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) -a
pre-Gouled case. 229 F. Supp. at 476.
26. 47 Aiu. Jun. Searches & Seizures § 19 (Supp. 1964); Annot., 4 L. Ed.
2d 1983, 1988 (1960).
27. United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961), applied Gouled
to a waiver situation. Moreover, the same court in Reeves v. Warden, 226
F. Supp. 953, 960 (D. Md. 1964), held that Gouled must be applied to the
states because of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), and Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28. See United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930). For a
good criticism of this reasoning see Kaplan, Search and Seizure, a No-Man's
Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CAMFp. L. REv. 474, 478-79 (1961).
29. Cf. Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943).
30. See note 12 supra; cases cited note 25 supra.
31. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
[Vol. 49:565570
